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CHURCH, STATE AND NATION IN UKRAINE 1
by Serhii Plokhy
Much of the current discussion concerning the future of independent Ukraine
has centered on the issue of nation-building. Two models of the Ukrainian state, (1)
national (the state of the ‘Ukrainian people’) and (2) multi-ethnic (the state of ‘the
people of Ukraine’), usually serve as starting points for scholarly discussions.2
It is quite obvious that the future of church-state relations in Ukraine will
depend heavily on the choices made by the newly independent state in its nationbuilding strategy. It is equally true that the religious policy of the government and the
response to it on the part of organized religion will influence the process of
nation-building. In the area of church-state relations, current Ukrainian governments
face the dilemma of either forging an alliance with the traditional (national) churches,
or allowing “all flowers to bloom,” with consequent equal treatment of all
denominations, including those closely linked to neighboring states (especially Russia
and Poland).

1 Previously unpublished. Translated from Ukrainian original by Myroslav Yurkevich.
2

For a discussion of nation-building in post-1991 Ukraine, see Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of
Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York, 1993); Dominique Arel, ‘‘Ukraine: The
Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” in Politics, Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y., 1995), pp. 157-88; Andrew Wilson,
Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge, 1997); Frank E. Sysyn, AUkrainian
Nationalism’: A Minority Faith?” Harriman Review 10, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 12-20.
On problems of church-state relations, see my “Nezalezhna Ukraina: derzhavna tserkva chy
hromadianska relihiia?” Pamiatky Ukrainy, nos. 2-3 (1992): 3-6.
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For contemporary analysts of church-state relations, the concepts of freedom
of conscience (religious belief) and the separation of church and state are closely
associated. Historically, both concepts are identified primarily with the United States,
where the first-freedom of belief-is firmly based on the second-separation of church
and state. But the so-called ‘liberal’ model, which provides for the maximum
feasible separation of church and state, has been fully implemented only in the land of
its origin, the USA. In Western Europe, models often far removed from the American
one have proved successful, i.e., the principle of freedom of conscience is protected
concurrently with the functioning of state churches or various degrees of state
‘interference’ in church affairs.
Contemporary Ukraine has yet to make a clear choice between the American
and the European models of guaranteeing freedom of conscience. Purely geographic
considerations would suggest that Ukraine follow the examples of its European
neighbors. But from the historical viewpoint, Ukrainian society, like that of North
America, is a product of colonization and an ‘advancing frontier’ more closely
resembling the American model than the European.
In Ukraine, the discussion of which road to take-whether to ‘Ukrainize’ the
traditional churches (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) and make them into state bodies,
or to abandon all hope in their nation-building potential and throw open the doors to
Protestantism and its attendant spirit of capitalism-was begun more than a century
ago by Mykhailo Drahomanov.3 That discussion is by no means over, but its subject
has already entered current political debate.
The present article concerns the formation of religious policy in Ukraine
between 1991 and 1996 and examines the ways in which it was influenced by the
nation-building agenda of the newly independent state. The traditions inherited by
independent Ukraine in the area of church-state relations will also be considered. The
3 On the place of Protestantism in Mykhailo Drahomanov’s political plans, see especially Ivan
Lysiak-Rudnytsky, ‘Drahomanov iak politychnyi teoretyk,’ Istorychni ese (Kyiv, 1994), 1:308-9;
English version in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ‘Drahomanov as a political Theorist,’ Essays in Modern
Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987), pp.212-14.
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following discussion will be restricted to twentieth-century traditions, which comprise
two dominant influences-that of the brief period of Ukrainian statehood in the years
1917-20 and that of the Soviet period.
Religious policies of Ukrainian governments, 1917-20
The period of Ukrainian political sovereignty during the years of the
revolution and civil war left a legacy of religious policies of four political formations:
(1) the Central Rada, (2) the Hetmanate, (3) the Directory, and (4) the Western
Ukrainian People’s Republic. The leading figures of the Central Rada, who were
mainly of a socialist orientation, proceeded from the principle of the separation of
church and state, but left very little by way of a legacy in that sphere.4 As for the
religious policy of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, it was not declared in
practice, although the Greek Catholic Church actually functioned as a state church,
and distinct confessional features marked the Ukrainian-Polish war. The government
of the republic guaranteed all its citizens equal rights regardless of religious belief,
nationality, etc., but such guarantees were standard fare in the declarations of all the
new states of Eastern Europe.5
An analysis of the religious policies of the Hetmanate and the Directory holds
considerably more interest for the analyst of church-state relations. Beginning
virtually with the first weeks of its existence, the administration of Hetman Pavio
Skoropadsky conducted an active religious policy. The ‘Laws on the Provisional State
Order of Ukraine,’ dated 29 April 1918, proclaimed freedom of religious belief, but
also asserted that “the Orthodox Christian faith is the leading faith in the Ukrainian
State.” The basic legislative provisions of the Hetmanate’s religious policy clearly
4 On the policy of the Central Rada in church-state relations, see Ivan Vlasovs’kyi, Narys istorii
Ukrains'koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy (New York and Bound Brook, 1961), vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 20-24, and
Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, ‘The Politics of Religion in the Ukraine: The Orthodox Church and the
Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1919,’ Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies: Occasional Paper
# 202, pp. 10-13. The latest study of the topic, based on extensive archival research, is by Vasyl’
Ul’ianovs’kyi, Tserkva v Ukrains'kii derzhavi, 1917-1920 (Doba Tsentral'noi Rady) (Kyiv, 1997).
5 See the text of the declaration of the Ukrainian National Council of 1 November 1918 in
Politolohiia. Rinets' XIX-persha polovyna XX qt.: Khrestomatiia, ed. Ostap Semkiv (Lviv, 1996), p.
768.
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replicated the fundamental principles of the religious policy of the Provisional
Government of Russia (1917), proclaiming the Orthodox Church de facto a state
church.6

6 See the somewhat different versions of the Hetman government’s law “On the Faith” in
Politolohiia (Lviv, 1996), p. 766 and Martyrolohiia ukrainsikykh tserkov, vol. 1, Ukrainsika
pravoslavna tserkva: dokumenty, materiialy, khrystyiansikyi samvydav Ukrainy (Toronto and
Baltimore, 1987), p. 40.
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With regard to the Orthodox Church, the two governments of the Hetmanate
that succeeded each other in 1918 followed a rather consistent policy based on the
principle that a sovereign state required an independent church. This idea was first
enunciated at the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor in January 1918, following the
proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Central Rada. The minister for religious
affairs in the first government of the Hetmanate, Vasyl Zinkivsky, worked resolutely
with the leadership and delegates of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor to proclaim
the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was expected that the first step
toward the achievement of that goal would be the establishment of a Ukrainian
Orthodox Church made up of the Ukrainian eparchies of the Russian Orthodox
Church, headed by the Metropolitan of Kyiv, and the winning of autonomous status
for that church within the framework of the Moscow Patriarchate. Zinkivsky managed
to attain that intermediate goal. Under government pressure, the members of the sober
appealed to the Patriarch of Moscow to grant autonomy, which Moscow did,
amending the conditions of the grant to its own advantage.7

7 On the religious policy of the Hetman government, see Vlasovs’kyi, Narys, vol. 4, bk. 2, pp. 43-59.
For a new interpretation of Zinkivsky’s activities, based on previously unpublished documents, see the
article by Vasyl’ Ul’ianovs’kyi and Bohdan Andrusyshyn, “Tserkva v ukrains’kii het ‘mans ‘kid
derzhavi: poperedni notatky ta dokumenty,” Ost~nndi hetiman: iuvileinyi zLirnyk pam"iati Pavla
Skoropadsikoho, 1873-1945 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 285-397.
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The minister for religious affairs in the second Hetman government,
Oleksander Lototsky, was now in a position to pose the question of autocephaly for
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in absolutely unequivocal terms to those attending
the sobor. His argument was based precisely on the idea that a sovereign state
required an independent church. Most participants in the sobor were nevertheless
hostile to Lototsk’’s attitude. The Hetman’s agreement to Ukraine’s federal union
with Russia, the withdrawal of the Germans, the anti-Hetman coup and the
termination of the council’s activity ended the efforts of the Ukrainian government to
reach an understanding with the church leadership on the question of autocephaly.8
Law of the Directory-the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic
that replaced the Hetman’s rule-proclaimed the autocephaly Ukrainian Orthodoxyon
1 January 1919. The possibility of a government proclamation of autocephaly was
first discussed under the Hetmanate and was to have been implemented in the event
that the pro-Russian episcopate of the church refused to cooperate with the
government on the matter. The impossibility of a compromise with Metropolitan
Antonli (Khrapovitsky) of Kyiv and his followers became completely apparent with
the Directory’s takeover of power. This impasse was also apparently responsible for
the government’s choice of a synodal form of administration for the new church. It
was based on the Erastian model of church-state relations, introduced into the Russian
Empire by Peter I, in which the church played the role of a virtual department of state.
Under the new law, a Ukrainian Church Synod financed by the state and meeting in
the presence of a government representative was to become the governing body of the
church.9
8 Olekeander Lototsky’s activity as minister of religious affairs in the Hetman government is
described in his memoirs, Storinky mynuloho, 4 vols. (Warsaw, 1932-39, repr. 1966). In addition to
Vlasovs’kyi’s account, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw provides a survey of the Hetman government’s religious
policy (“The Politics of Religion in the Ukraine,” pp. 20-32). The most recent work on Oleksander
Lototsky’s life and work is Andre Partykevich, “My Prayer Went Unanswered: Olekeander Lototsky
and Ukrainian Autocephaly, 1917-1939” Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1994.
9 See the Directory’s law on the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in Martyrolohiia
ukrains’kykh tserkov, 1: 50.
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The proclamation of the Act of Union of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and
the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic confronted Ukrainian leaders with the fact
of the coexistence within one state of the two traditional Ukrainian churches,
Orthodox and Greek Catholic. As a practical measure, the Directory reacted by
establishing a Ukrainian diplomatic mission at the Vatican.10 On the theoretical plane,
the possibility was considered of electing the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv,
Andrei Sheptytsky, to the Kyiv metropolitanate, followed by acceptance of the Union
by the Orthodox and the Pope’s subsequent proclamation of a Ukrainian patriarchate.
One of the reputed authors of that idea, the prominent writer and statesman
Volodymyr Vynnychenko, saw it as a means of separating Ukraine from both Poland
and Russia in denominational terms.11
Wartime conditions did not permit the Directory fully to implement the
autocephaly proclaimed by law, to say nothing of Vynnychenko’s more controversial
ideas. It was only in exile that the Supreme Otaman of the Directory (head of state of
the Ukrainian People’s Republic), Symon Petliura, expressed the idea of establishing
a Ukrainian Orthodox patriarchate.12
To summarize the policies adopted by the Ukrainian governments of 1918-19
in preliminary fashion, it should be noted that the only fully successful one was the
compromise plan of the Hetman administration to create an autonomous Orthodox
church in Ukraine. It was in those years that the problems of Ukrainian Orthodox
autocephaly and of relations between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches were
first brought forward as matters of state policy. As will be seen below, some

10 On relations between Ukraine and the Vatican during the revolution, see Ivan Khoma, AUkrains’ke
posol’stvo pry Apostol’s’komu Prestoli, 1919-1921,” Bohosloviia 45 (1981): 3-65.
11 See the memoirs of Lonhyn Tsehel’s’kyi, Vid legend do pravdy: Spomyny pro podii v Ukraini
z’iazani z Pershym Lystopada 1918 r. (New York and Philadelphia, 1960), pp. 192-95.
12 See excerpts of Petliura’s letter, dated 19 December 1921, to Ivan Ohiienko, minister for religious
affairs in the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (later Metropolitan Ilarion of the
Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada) in Symon Petliura: Statti, lysty, dokamenty (New York,
1956), pp. 400-403.
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approaches to the solution of those problems were to exert considerable influence on
the church policy of independent Ukraine after 1991.

The Soviet legacy
The influence of Soviet religious policy on the practice of church-state
relations in independent Ukraine can scarcely be exaggerated. All the major actors in
the reform of church-state relations in Ukraine after 1991 were products of the Soviet
era, including the first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk himself, who, in his
own ironic formulation, had played the role of the ‘first atheist’ of Ukraine in the
1980s.13
Soviet religious policy originated with the adoption of Lenin’s well-known
decree on the separation of church and state, as well as of school and church (January
1918). Its general features conform to the ‘anti-church’ model of church-state
relations. In simplified terms, Soviet religious policy may be divided into two major
periods. The first, encompassing the 1920s and 30s, was characterized by an overtly
anti-religious posture on the part of the state, which fought the church with every
means at its disposal. Most notably, those means included direct pressure and
repression, sowing division in the ecclesiastical milieu, and setting one church against
another. It was in this period, between 1921 and 1930, that the authorities permitted
the existence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) as a
temporary measure in order to undermine the status of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The second period began in 1943, when the government permitted the
appointment of a patriarch in Moscow. The enfeebled Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC) was then transformed into a disciplined instrument of state, and official policy
toward the church began to acquire a number of features characteristics of the
Erastian model of church-state relations. Early in this period, between 1946 and 1949,
the ROC was exploited by the state as an effective tool for the liquidation of the

13 For Leonid Kravchuk’s comments on his attitude toward religion, see Valentyn Chemerys,
Prezydent (Kyiv, 1994), p. 85.
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Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which was thoroughly Ukrainian in spirit,
in Galicia and Transcarpathia.14

14 For the detailed history of the Stalinist supression of the Greek Catholic Church see Bohdan R.
Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950J (Edmonton, and
Toronto, 1996).
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The religious policy of the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail
Gorbachev should be considered as belonging to this period. During the Khrushchev
administration, religious policy consisted mainly of repression, while the Gorbachev
years were notable in Ukraine for successful efforts to set one denomination against
another. But in both cases the government attempted to treat the church above all as
an instrument of its own policy.15
In general, the legacy of the Soviet period in church-state relations was one of
legal and illegal state surveillance of religious life and active intervention of the state
authorities in church affairs. In the USSR the gradual transformation of the church
into a tool of the atheist regime fostered the development of more or less stable
alliances between the ecclesiastical and Communist Party elites at both the local and
republic levels. In Kyiv this took the form of an alliance between the communist
authorities and the hierarchy of the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC), which joined forces in 1988-90 to combat the renaissance of the
Greek Catholic and Autocephalous churches.

15 For the recent surveys of Soviet religious policy see John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in
the Soviet Union and Successor States (Cambridge, 1994); Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church:
A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford, 1995); and Jane
Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness (Oxford, 1996).
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In the latter half of the 1980s, during the administration of the first secretary
of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the Kyiv authorities,
sought to prevent the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church at all costs. Heedless
of Moscow’s overtly liberal line, they colluded in the mass transfer of former Greek
Catholic churches to the Moscow Patriarchate, and tolerated the autocephalist
movement in Galicia as anti-Catholic even as they combated it in central and eastern
Ukraine.16 The religious conflict that independent Ukraine inherited from the former
Soviet Union was inflamed by the active participation of the state apparatus at the
oblast and republic levels. After 1991 it was up to that same apparatus not to fan the
flames of conflict but to eliminate it in the interests of independent Ukraine. At that
historical juncture and within the personalities of those individuals, the Soviet
experience had its contradictory encounter with the tradition of the religious policies
of the Ukrainian governments of 1917-20. The virtually intact Soviet apparatus
represented the old Soviet tradition. The renaissance of the independent tradition was
led by the new head of the Council for Religious Affairs, the historian Arsen
Zinchenko, and his associate, the Ukrainian Republican Party activist Artur Hubar.
The religious policy of the Kravchuk administration (1991-94) was in no small
measure the product of the encounter of those traditions.

The religious policy of the Kravchuk administration
In 1991 the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted a law on religious
associations that resembled the old Soviet legislation in proclaiming the complete
separation of church and state. But it was much more democratic than the laws
previously in force. In many respects, this law could be termed a declaration of intent
on the part of the state, while the historical tradition inherited by society and daily
mundane political circumstances impelled state functionaries toward active

16 According to Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate),
official policy toward the UGCC and the UAOC in Galicia was based on the precedent of the revival
of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in 1968. Author’s interview with Patriarch Filaret, 24
September 1997.

11

intervention in church affairs.17 By August 1991, when Ukraine declared its
independence, the Ukrainian churches had become deeply involved in political
conflict. Each of them had its political sponsors, who in turn enjoyed church support
in election campaigns, and political activity, etc.

17 See the text of the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” Vidomosti
Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainsikoi RSR, vyp. 25 (Kyiv, 1991). For English translations of the allUnion and
Russian Federation laws on freedom of conscience, see Igor Troianovsky, Religion in the Soviet
Republics: A Guide to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Other Religions (San Francisco,
1991), pp. 19-37.
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Probably the last serious decision made by Moscow in the area of church-state
affairs in Ukraine was the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. After
that, the management of church-state relations and the settlement of denominational
conflicts in the republic came increasingly under the authority of Kyiv. At the same
time, Kyiv’s power over church-state relations was rather illusory. The Kyiv
leadership proved incapable of grasping the power that had slipped from Moscow’s
hands. The dissolution of power that had begun in Moscow was not halted at the level
of Kyiv, but went on apace. That process was intensified by the division of power in
Kyiv-the struggle between the Supreme Council, headed by Leonid Kravchuk, and
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, led by Stanislav Hurenko-as well as
the growing influence of regional elites and local councils elected in the spring of
1990.18
The failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow thrust political initiative into
the hands of the Supreme Council in Kyiv. The proclamation of Ukraine’s
independence and election of Leonid Kravchuk as a first president of Ukraine in
December 1991, in turn established the presidential administration as the main
generator of ideas in the realm of church-state relations. Like the Hetman government
before it, the administration of President Kravchuk staked the achievement of
autocephaly not on a rather inconsiderable pro-Ukrainian church organization (the
Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius in 1918 and the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church [UAOC] in 1991), but on a powerful Orthodox church with a large
following subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate. In this respect, the Ukrainian
administration found itself more or less at the terminus reached by the government of
Hetman Skoropadsky in 1918: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the largest in
Ukraine, was an autonomous body within the framework of the Moscow Patriarchate.
True, the terms of autonomy were now considerably more generous: the UOC was
granted Aliberty and independence of administration.”

18 On the political situation in Ukraine in late 1990 and early 1991, see Volodymyr LyLvyn,
Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 218-68.
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Even though the Kravchuk administration, unlike the Hetman government, did
not proclaim Orthodoxy the ‘leading faith,’ all of its activity in the area of
church-state relations was directed toward the establishment of a de facto state church
of the Ukrainian Orthodox denomination.
The government found a devoted supporter and executor of its plans in the
head of the UOC, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), who had held the Kyiv
metropolitanate since 1966 and was well known for his anti-Uniate and antiautocephalous views. Compared with the fruitless efforts of the Hetmanate to win
over Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitsky), this was an unqualified success for the
Kravchuk administration. It was based on the previously noted alliance between the
church hierarchy and the secular Communist Party elite during the Soviet period.
Moscow managed, however, to exploit tensions within the church in Ukraine,
particularly the Ukrainian episcopate’s dissatisfaction with Filaret, in order to
remove him from church leadership in the spring of 1992. In June of that year, with
the support of the government, Filaret became one of the leaders of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which he had once persecuted, and which was now
renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). This
new church enjoyed substantial support from the government during the
administration of President Leonid Kravchuk.19 The establishment of a state church,
which the Council for Religious Affairs was in fact bringing about, involved inter alia
the defense of the UOC-KP not only against its Orthodox competitors, but against
those of other denominations as well. Its main Orthodox rival was the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church that remained under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate
(UOC-MP). Kyiv’s policy toward another national church, the Greek Catholic,
remained largely undefined during the Kravchuk administration. One of the signs of
19 See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Politics of Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek
Catholics,” in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael
Bourdeaux (Armonk, NY, and London, 1995), pp. 144-50. On developments within the Orthodox
Church in Ukraine, see Frank Sysyn, “The Russian Sobor and the Rejection of Ukrainian Orthodox
Autocephaly,” Ukrainian Weekly, 26 July 1996; Serhii Plokhii, “Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephaly and
Metropolitan Filaret,” Ukrainian Weekly, 2 August 1992.
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this was the lack of Ukrainian representation at the Vatican. Even the government of
the Directory had proceeded to establish its mission at the Holy See in 1919.
Another symptom of indecision was the central government’s complete
passivity in the matter of winning recognition of a Greek Catholic patriarchate. Even
though several prominent representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora made personal
appeals to President Kravchuk, arguing that the establishment of a patriarchate would
serve the purposes of state policy as concerned the need for an independent church in
a sovereign state, the government remained entirely passive on the question. This
passivity is particularly striking when compared with the government’s active
support for Orthodox autocephaly and the Orthodox Kyiv patriarchate. In a certain
sense, the religious policy of President Kravchuk even favored Roman Catholics over
Greek Catholics. In that respect it agreed with the Vatican’s official line. Thus one
national church, the Greek Catholic, was denied support, while another, the UOC-KP,
was generously showered with it.20
The roots of that policy might be explained in the close alliance between the
authorities and the Orthodox hierarchy, especially Metropolitan Filaret; who (not
without reason) regarded the Greek Catholics as his competitors. This is in keeping
with the traditional suspicion with which Uniates had been treated in the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union, and also with the official policy of the creation of a
state church that was to be exclusively Orthodox.
The semi-official attitude of the government that there was to be an
independent church in a sovereign state also served to define the main lines of official
policy toward Protestants and representatives of other non-traditional churches in
Ukraine. On the one hand, the government attempted to make the administrative
centers of those churches independent of Moscow, a goal that it more or less
effectively achieved.21 On the other hand, it was open to pressure from the Orthodox
20 On the issue of the Greek Catholic patriarchate, see my article, “Between Moscow and Rome:
Struggle for the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine,” Journal of Church and State 37 (Autumn
1995): 849-68.
21 On the status of the Protestant churches in Ukraine, see Vasyl Markus, “Politics and Religion in
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hierarchs who were its allies and who demanded resolute measures against the flood
of missionaries entering Ukraine from the West.

Ukraine: In Search of a New Pluralistic Dimension,” in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia, pp. 169-77.
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The Moscow Patriarchate demanded similar measures from the government of
Russia. Because of international public protests against changes in Russian
legislation, measures to limit the activity of foreign missionaries in Russia were
blocked. In Ukraine, however, such legislative changes were made almost invisibly.
There was virtually no protest against them, and the amendments were adopted by
parliament following the attempt of members of the White Brotherhood to seize the
St. Sophia Cathedral in the autumn of 1993, which was widely featured in the
media.22 It was generally considered that the discriminatory changes in legislation
were directed toward Russia, since most of the ‘brothers’ had come to Ukraine, and
they did not lead to any noticeable restrictions on the activity of Western
missionaries. As in the past, those missionaries could preach freely in Ukraine and
buy time on radio and television, competing only with the officially supported
UOC-KP in terms of hours of airtime.

The religious policy of the Kuchma administration
In July 1994, almost all the newspapers of Ukraine and some foreign
publications carried a photograph showing the new Ukrainian president, Leonid
Kuchma, taking the oath of office in parliament. During this procedure the
president’s hand rested on the Peresopnytsia gospel, a sixteenth-century Ukrainian
manuscript codex.23 Taking the oath on that ancient manuscript meant simultaneously
swearing an oath before God (who in this instance might be considered Orthodox,

22 Amendments and addenda to Ukraine’s law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations” were introduced by resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 23 December
1993. On the activity of the White Brotherhood and the “living god” Marina Tsvigun, see Oleksandr
Skoryna, “Zhyttia v borh i zhyttia na znyshchennia,” Ukrains'ka hazeta, nos. 19, 20 (1993); Yladimir
Skachko, “Boginia rodilas’ v Donetske, a mozhet sest’ v Kieve,” Zerkalo nedeli, 11 March 1995. The
brotherhood’s attempts to seize the St. Sophia Cathedral and the arrest of its leaders were also reported
in the foreign press, e.g., Malcolm Gray, “Kiev’s Cult of Doom,” Maclean's, 22 November 1993, pp.
32-33.
23 This popular photograph found its way onto the covers of several books in Ukraine, e.g.,
Volodymyr Lytvyn, Politychna arena Ukrainy.
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given the provenance of the gospel) and Ukraine (since the manuscript is considered
one of the most hallowed texts of Ukrainian culture).
By swearing his oath on the Peresopnytsia gospel, Leonid Kuchma was in
effect continuing the tradition begun by his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, who had
taken his oath on the same gospel following his election as president in 1991. But this
was the only instance in which Kuchma imitated Kravchuk in the area of church-state
relations. All subsequent actions contradicted rather than continued what his
predecessor had done.
The new government’s decision to support the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) fully corresponded to
the broader policy of the presidential administration on questions of nationality,
culture and language. That policy was determined by the basic postulates of Leonid
Kuchma’s electoral program and the circumstances of his struggle for the presidency
with the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk. The organizers of the Kravchuk campaign,
seeking to distract voter attention from economic problems and government inaction
on economic reform, staked their fortunes on the national question. During the
campaign, Kravchuk was represented as the sole guarantor of Ukrainian
independence, which would be surrendered to Moscow in the event of Kuchma’s
coming to power.
Leonid Kuchma sought electoral support primarily among the culturally
Russified electorate of southern and eastern Ukraine, often playing up to the pro-Russian attitudes of a portion of that electorate. Echoes of his campaign rhetoric were
also apparent in the text of his inaugural address, in which Kuchma promised to fight
for the granting of official status to the Russian language and employed Russian,
especially Eurasian, political terminology to identify the strategic position and
foreign-policy interests of Ukraine.24

24 For a survey of the electoral campaign, see Lytvyn, Politychna arena Ukrainy, pp. 450-76.
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The church question came to Leonid Kuchma’s attention during his first days
in office. It is worth noting that the presidential decree on the liquidation of the
Committee for Religious Affairs-the symbol of active state intervention in the affairs
of religious associations-was signed on the same day (26 July 1994) as the decree
appointing the head of the presidential administration. A ministry with an awkward
designation-the ministry for nationalities, migration and cults, replaced the
committee.25 The date of the signing of the decree and the poorly conceived name of
the new ministry (an observer, commenting on the word “cults,” noted that at least
“superstitions” had not been used instead) testify to the hastiness of the decision and
the new administration’s desire to dissociate itself from the policy introduced by its
predecessor.26
The direction of the president’s new policy became apparent with the
appointment of Vasyl Sereda, until then an advisor in the presidential administration
and an opponent of the former leadership of the Committee on Religious Affairs. In
the autumn of 1994 Sereda was appointed to the post of minister for nationalities,
migration and cults, with responsibility for religious affairs. When the Kravchuk
administration was in office, Sereda had come out against state support for the
UOC-KP and in favor of ending the government’s ‘cold war’ against the UOC-MP.
Now, having become the country’s leading official responsible for shaping church-state relations, Sereda was able to deprive the UOC-KP of official favor and provide
tacit support for the UOC-MP.27

25 Radio Free Europe Listing, 28 July 1994.

26 On the role of the “church question” in the presidential election, see Viktor Ielens’kyi, “Tserkva i
derzhava: seredyna 1994 g.,” Ukraina i svit, 20-26 July 1994), p. 11.
27 Information based on the author’s interviews with Artur Hubar, a former official of the disbanded
Council for Religious Affairs (September 1994). On the activity of the Council for Religious Affairs,
see an article by its former deputy head, H. Kutsenko, in Narodna hazeta, no. 43 (November 1994)
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The coming to power of Leonid Kuchma, the dissolution of the pro-Filaret
Committee for Religious Affairs, and the administration’s new course in the area of
church-state relations greatly harmed relations between the state and the UOC-KP.
This created a strained and explosive situation. What sparked the transformation of
the ‘cold war’ into a ‘hot’ one was the dispute between the government and the
church over the place of interment of the patriarch of the UOC-KP, Volodymyr
(Romaniuk), on 18 July 1995. In fact, the incident was provoked by the ongoing
rivalry between the UOC-KP and the UOCMP for control over the sacred sites of
Kyiv, the most eminent of which were under state ownership.28
The Moscow Patriarchate had rooted itself in the Kyivan Caves Monastery,
while the Kyiv Patriarchate had taken uncertain hold of a portion of the less
prestigious Vydubychi Monastery. But the main prize, the Cathedral of St. Sophia,
remained under the complete control of the state. Rumors circulated in Kyiv about the
government’s readiness to assign the churches of St. Cyril, St. Andrew, and a
number of other city churches to the UOC-MP. Given that situation, the UOC-KP
decided to stake everything on an attempt to bury its patriarch on the grounds of St.
Sophia, thereby gaining at least a foothold on the territory of the greatest shrine of
East Slavic Christendom.29
The government, which was of course under pressure from its new ally, the
UOC-MP, opposed the interment of the patriarch at St. Sophia, the Caves Monastery,
or Vydubychi. It granted permission instead for burial at the state Baikove Cemetery
or on the grounds of the St. Volodymyr Cathedral. The question as to where the
patriarch would be buried remained unresolved even up to the very the day of his

28 On the struggle between the Orthodox churches over the sacred sites of Kyiv, see my article, “Kyiv
vs. Moscow: The Autocephalous Movement in Independent Ukraine,” Harriman Review 9, nos. 1-2
(Spring 1996): 32-37.
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Preparations for the transfer of the Church of St. Cyril to the UOC-MP, the taking away of the
Church of St. Andrew from the UOC-KP, and the petition of that church for partial or full ownership
of the St. Sophia complex, the Kyivan Caves Monastery, the Vydubychi Monastery, and the Church of
the Savior at Berestove are all discussed in the appeal of the UOC-KP to the President and Premier of
Ukraine. See the publication of the UOCKP, Pravoslavnyi visnyk, no. 10 (October 1995): 3-4.
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funeral. It was in this situation that Metropolitan Filaret, yielding to the demands of
the paramilitary Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense
(UNA-UNSO) and nationalist deputies who had attended the funeral together with the
former patron of the UOC-KP, ex-president Leonid Kravchuk, led the funeral
procession to the St. Sophia Cathedral.
A police cordon was brought down en route, but a special-purpose police
squad barricaded itself on the territory of St. Sophia, preventing the funeral
procession from entering. Lengthy negotiations between the deputies and government
representatives were unproductive. It was then decided to dig the patriarch’s grave
and bury him at the entrance to St. Sophia. The government reacted by ordering the
militia to clear the area in front of the cathedral and not to permit the interment of the
patriarch on St. Sophia Square. But by the time the police made their way onto the
square and began beating and violently dispersing those present, singling out
UNA-UNSO members, it was too late: the casket had already been lowered into a
hastily dug grave.30
The conflict on St. Sophia Square ended in tragedy and a resounding scandal
that undermined the prestige of the government and the presidential administration.
For the first time in Ukraine, which had attained independence bloodlessly and was
justly proud of its tolerant practices, blood had been shed and brute force applied.
Metropolitan Filaret and the UOC-KP could congratulate themselves. In a single day,
Filaret had been transformed from a figure suspected of arranging the patriarch’s
murder into a symbol of the national-democratic camp, the sole individual who could
unite the assorted national-democratic forces that were at odds with one another.
Confrontation with the government lay ahead for Filaret, but he now had the support

30 Almost all the Kyiv press carried detailed descriptions of the events of “Black Tuesday.” See
especially the accounts of the pro-UOC-KP in Molod' Ukrainy and the pro-UOC-MP in Nezavisimost':
Liudmyla Shevchuk, “Prostit’ nas vladyko,” Molod’ Ukrainy, 20 July 1995; Ol’ga Musafirova,
“Bog prostit? Kak khoronili sviateishego patriarkha Kievskogo i vsei Ukrainy-Rusi Vladimira
(Romaniuka),” Nezavisimost', 21 July 1995. Two full pages of Nezavisimost' were devoted to
interviews with eyewitnesses.
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of the national-democratic political forces, which was particularly important for
winning the election as patriarch at the future sobor of the UOC-KP.31

31 On the opening of a criminal investigation into the mysterious death of Patriarch Volodymyr, see
Nezavisimost', 28 July 1995. For the reaction of national-democratic forces to the events of “Black
Tuesday,” see letters and information about the beating of participants in the funeral procession in
Molod' Ukrainy, 21, 25 and 27 July 1995.
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Despite the obvious efforts of the government to prevent the election of Filaret
as patriarch of the UOC-KP, he was elected to that post at a church sobor in October
1995. Parliamentary deputies who supported Filaret openly accused representatives of
the administration of supporting Filaret’s competitors and of seeking to split the
church during the sober. Having lost their confrontation with Filaret, the hierarchs of
the largest western parishes of the UOC-KP, led by the metropolitan of
Ivano-Frankivsk, Andrii (Horak), announced their departure from the church and their
adherence to the revived Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), a
weak rival of the UOC-KP. Some also discerned the hand of the state behind efforts
to link the UAOC with the UOC-MP in an anti-Filaret front. Negotiations between
the two churches began with the support of the government immediately after the
desertion of the western Ukrainian hierarchs.32
Filaret managed, however, to stay in power, achieve election as patriarch,
prevent a complete exodus of western Ukrainian parishes from his church, and
strengthen and deepen his alliances with national-democratic politicians. The
investigation into the circumstances of Patriarch Volodymyr’s death, which was
potentially dangerous to Filaret, also concluded without result. In short order, the
government found itself obliged to admit the pointlessness of the confrontation and its
de facto defeat.
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On the proceedings and results of the sobor of the UAOC-KP, see the Toronto newspaper Ukraina i
svit, 25-31 October and 1-7 November 1995. Differing assessments of the sobor’s proceedings are
presented in articles by Liudmyla Shevchuk in Molod’ Ukrainy, 24 and 26 October (her article
“Sviate mistse pustym ne buvaie” and her interview with the newly elected Patriarch Filaret, “Hotovi
na diialoh liubovi”) and Vasilii Anisimov in Nezavisimost’, 25 October 1995 (“No chto-to angely
poiut takimi zlymi golosami,” in the newspaper’s “scandal” department).
The authorities made a show of ignoring Filaret’s election as patriarch. He was greeted by the
ambassador of the USA to Ukraine, but not by the president or by the head of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine. On the refusal of the Head of the Supreme Council, Oleksandr Moroz, to send greetings to
Filaret on his election as patriarch, see the interview with Moroz in Holos Ukrainy, 1 November 1995.
Without naming names in the interview, Moroz condemned deputies of the national-democratic bloc
who supported the UOC-KP and expressed the hope that the new deputies’ association “For the
Establishment of a Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church” would not support the creation of a state church
(for which the national democrats were calling).
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Toward the end of 1995 the ministry for nationalities, migration and cults was
dissolved, and the State Committee for Religious Affairs became a separate entity.
Anatolii Koval was appointed its head. Vasyl Sereda, whose activity was closely
associated with the policy of the administration and the events of 18 July, was
sacrificed for the sake of the normalization of relations between the state and the
UOC-KP.33
A further sign of change in government policy toward the UOC-KP was a
visit to Patriarch Filaret in early 1996 by the head of the presidential administration,
Dmytro Tabachnyk. Soon afterwards interviews with Filaret and articles signed by
him began to appear in the government media, including the magazine Viis'ko
Ukrainy (Army of Ukraine). The tone of Filaret’s public appearances also changed
from confrontational vis-a-vis the government to ironic, exuding the spirit of civil
peace and religious tolerance.34 The apogee of the politics of reconciliation became
President Kuchma’s patronage of a project to put the grave of Patriarch Volodymyr
in order, to which Filaret responded by canceling plans for a mass commemoration on
the anniversary of the death of the patriarch.
Thus for the first time in five years of Ukrainian independence the
government renounced a policy of confrontation and entered into a dialogue with the
two largest Ukrainian Orthodox churches.

Kuchma vs. Kravchuk: The events of “Black Tuesday”

33 The agenda of the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs was presented by its head,
“natolii Koval, in an interview with the newspaper Uriadovyi kur”ier, 8 February 1996.
34 See Patriarch Filaret’s article, “Hospody, kudy nam ity?,” Viis'ko Ukrainy, nos. 3-4 (1996): 20.
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The events of “Black Tuesday”-the beating by police units of participants in
the funeral procession of Patriarch Volodymyr on 18 July 1995Cdemonstrated the
level of engagement of the church in Ukrainian politics and the Ukrainian state in
relations between the churches. With the election of Leonid Kuchma as president of
Ukraine, the UOC-KP became, more than ever, a rallying point for national
democrats who wanted a ‘Ukrainian Ukraine’ in linguistic, cultural, and political
terms. The UOC-MP received the support of forces striving to maintain Russian
dominance in Ukraine’s spiritual life and of those who simply considered Ukrainian
independence to be a transient phase. The death and burial of Patriarch Volodymyr
served as an occasion for the UOC-KP and the national-democratic organizations
active in Ukrainian political life to demonstrate their opposition to the new
presidential policy in no uncertain terms. The government, which was then lending
tacit support to the UOC-MP, pretended to pay no particular attention to the death of
the patriarch, who had also been a long-time political prisoner, and later closely
associated with politicians of a national-democratic orientation.
The attempt to treat the death of Patriarch Volodymyr, the leader of a church
in conflict with the government, as a matter of secondary importance becomes
particularly apparent when one compares it with official reaction to the death of
another eminent figure-the ‘patriarch of Ukrainian literature,’ as he was called in
the press, Oles Terentilovych Honchar. The funeral of Honchar, which took place on
the day before that of Patriarch Volodymyr, was treated with the greatest attention by
the government. The president, the head of the government, and the head of the
Supreme Council, stood as an honor guard beside the casket of the deceased writer.
The funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr, however, took place on the following day
without the presence of leading figures of state. At the time of the confrontation
between the funeral procession and the forces of law and order on St. Sophia Square,
the president was in Belarus on an official visit. The head of government was the
guest of a collective farm in the Kyiv region and was represented at the funeral by his
deputy, and the head of the Supreme Council was visiting the editorial office of a
Kyiv newspaper.
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A number of reasons may be advanced for the different treatment of the two
funerals by the government. One reason was that Oles Honchar was to some extent a
universal figure respected in the broadest strata of society, beginning with national
democrats and ending with communists. He was a symbol of Ukrainian
independence, vintage 1991. Honchar’s undeniable patriotism and sincere concern
for the fate of Ukraine, united in his career with enforced conformism and
membership in the Communist Party of Ukraine and its Central Committee, made
him a hero and a symbol of the new Ukraine, which had emerged in rather organic
fashion from the cocoon of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
However, the figure of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) was extraordinarily
controversial. A virtual saint in the eyes of the national-democratic camp, he was the
incarnation of aggressive nationalism for eastern Ukrainian politicians. Born in
western Ukraine, long imprisoned in Soviet forced-labor camps, a former emigrant to
Canada, he was merely tolerated, but not permitted access to the new Ukrainian
(former Soviet republican) elite. The national revolution, embodied in the life and
work of Patriarch Volodymyr, had attained its goal of independence for Ukraine, but
had lost the battle with the former Soviet nomenklatura for the right to determine the
character and politics of the new country.35
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The attitudes of various social groups and political circles to the deaths of Oles Honchar and
Patriarch Volodymyr were reflected in the reactions of three newspapers- Nezavisimost', which was
close to the UOC-MP; Molod’ Ukrainy, close to the UOCKP; and Holos Ukrainy, the newspaper of
the Supreme Council. Nezavisimos’ (19 July 1995) carried the news of the death of Honchar on its
front page (Halyna Datsiuk’s article, “Svet uma. Svet liubvi. Svet nadezhdy”), without mentioning
the death of Patriarch Volodymyr. Molod’ Ukrainy ( 18 July 1995) carried the news of the death of
Patriarch Volodymyr at the top of its front page (“Pam”iati velykoho patriarkha”) and that of the
death of Honchar at the bottom (“Orlyna vysota Olesia Honchara”).
Holos Ukrainy (18 July 1995) carried the official announcement of the death of Honchar at
the top of its third page, signed not only by the president and the ruling elite but also by Viacheslav
Chornovil, a leader of the national-democratic bloc in parliament, while a brief announcement of the
death of Patriarch Volodymyr signed by the Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council of the
UOC-KP appeared at the bottom. Subsequently the newspaper devoted considerable attention to
Honchar and rather little, compared with other publications, to the events surrounding the funeral of
Patriarch Volodymyr. On 19 July it ran an article about the funeral of Honchar under the title
“Proshchavaite, bat’ku!” (“Farewell, Father!”), and published another notice marking the ninth day
following the writer’s demise.
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The reasons for the events of black Tuesday” should, of course, be sought not
only in the actions and attitudes of the government, but also in the goals and plans of
the UOC-KP and the national-democratic forces allied with it. Deprived of the
attention and support of the previous administration and split by internal strife
between the late patriarch and his deputy, Metropolitan Filaret, the UOC-KP was in
fact seeking a confrontation with the government. Open confrontation, as opposed to
the undeclared ‘cold’ war, could (and, as subsequent events were to show, did)
achieve several aims. First, it forced the government to reckon with the church and
end the policy of favoritism toward the UOC-MP. Second, it consolidated the position
of the church and the support of politicians (mainly parliamentary deputies) of a
national-democratic orientation. Third, it erased from the memories of the faithful the
long-drawn-out conflict between the late patriarch and his deputy, Metropolitan
Filaret, which had culminated with the mysterious death of the patriarch.
The national-democratic forces, represented at the funeral by parliamentary
deputies and members of the UNA-UNSO, had their own view of the situation and
their own program of action. Many of the rationally oriented politicians undoubtedly
considered the funeral of the patriarch an occasion to lend support to the national
church in its conflict with the ‘Muscovite priests’ and believed that they were
‘entitled’ to serious concessions from the government-in this particular case,
permission to bury the patriarch on the grounds of St. Sophia. In June 1995 the
national-democratic forces in parliament had given the president unwavering support
in his battle with the left, making possible a constitutional agreement between the
president and parliament. It was now time for the president to pay his debt to his
allies.
The radical UNA-UNSO had its own agenda. The presence of its paramilitary
units at the funeral of the patriarch was on the one hand an expression of the
well-established partnership between that organization and the UOC-KP. On the other
hand, the important role of the UNA-UNSO in the conduct of the funeral raised its
status among the other national-democratic groups. It must be noted that the
UNA-UNSO was the only participant in the events of ‘Black Tuesday’ that managed
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to achieve the goal it had set for itself. If the government and the national-democratic
parliamentary opposition had fallen into a serious quarrel that undermined their
authority to the delight of the left, the UNA-UNSO emerged from those events as a
martyr organization and the unofficial leader of the national-democratic bloc. This
was soon demonstrated by the formal presentation to the UNA-UNSO of the
blue-and-yellow flag that had first been carried into the Supreme Council following
the Moscow coup of August 1991. The flag, which until then had been in the
possession of Rukh (the Ukrainian Popular Front), was presented to the members of
the UNA-UNSO by Patriarch Filaret during a formal prayer service on St. Sophia
Square on the ninth day following the death of the patriarch.
During the period of intense conflict between Leonid Kravchuk and the
Kuchma administration that followed ‘BlackTuesday,’ both politicians made public
their perceptions of the events of that tragic day and their views of the model of
church-state relations required for the good of Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk was the
first to do so. He blamed the government for the tragedy that had taken place,
asserting that the reason for the conflict was the refusal of the authorities to work
together with the national church, which was an important factor in the rise of
Ukrainian national consciousness and nation-building. Leonid Kuchma, on the other
hand, identified the provocative actions of the nationalists and church officials who
had tried to drive the government into an impasse as the factor primarily responsible
for the tragedy. He noted that granting permission to inter the patriarch on the
grounds of St. Sophia would have worsened the government’s relations with the
other churches and contravened the policy of official noninterference in church
affairs.36
Thus the principal burden of Kravchuk’s statement was a defense of official
intervention in church affairs for the purpose of state-building and support of the
national cause. Kuchma, however, stressed the principle of the separation of church

36 See Leonid Kuchma’s commentary on the events of “Black Tuesday” in Holos Ukrainy, 27 July
1995.
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and state. The two statements reflected opposing views of the problem and were more
in the nature of political declarations than practical suggestions for resolving the
complex questions of church-state relations. After all, it is public knowledge that in
the last months of his presidency Leonid Kravchuk established good relations with
Filaret’s most powerful competitor, the UOC-MP. And the Kuchma administration,
for its part, initiated virtually open warfare with the UOC-KP following the events of
‘Black Tuesday’ and its declarations of non-interference.
Clearly, it was this ‘flexibility’ in resolving practical questions of church
state relations that allowed both political forces to achieve a compromise in the first
half of 1996 in order to attain their common goal, the adoption of a new Ukrainian
constitution.37 The government discontinued its pressure on the UOC-KP, while the
latter, in the person of Patriarch Filaret and his political allies, renounced its
anti-government propaganda and withdrew the demand for the establishment of a
state Orthodox Church (which the UOC-KP was to have become under a new
patriotic government). Thus was the grave of Patriarch Volodymyr put in order as a
result of the reconciliation of former enemies, the revival of old political alliances,
and a change in the orientation of presidential policy on questions of culture,
nationality and religion.

The constitutional compromise
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On developments in government circles during the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr, see the
explanations offered by Vice-Premier for Economic Affairs Roman Shpek (during the funeral of Oles’
Honchar, the prime minister assigned Shpek to oversee the funeral of the patriarch on the grounds that
the vice-premier was Orthodox): Oleksii Trotsenko, “Pro podii dovkola pokhoronu patriarkha
Volodymyra (Romaniuka),” Holos Ukrainy, 22 July 1995. See also an article by Ivan Bezsmertnyi,
AKryvavyi vivtorok mozhe vprovadyty ‘pryntsyp domino’ u velyku ukrains’ku polityku,” Chas, 8
September 1995, apparently written at the behest of persons close to Prime Minister Ievhen Marchuk.
In its issue of 21 July 1995, Nezavisimost' reported that the former head of President
Kravchuk’s personal security service, Viktor Palyvoda, had been arrested in Hungary on the request of
the Ukrainian authorities. According to the newspaper, Palyvoda had opened secret accounts abroad on
Kravchuk’s instructions, and a resounding political scandal was expected.
Developments in the spring of 1996 made it apparent that an accommodation had been reached
between the two presidents: they appeared together at a soccer match, and subsequently V.[?]
Matviienko, a crony of Leonid Kravchuk, was appointed acting presidential representative in Vinnytsia
oblast.
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The adoption of the constitution of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 signaled a
political truce between the warring parliamentary factions and created the
constitutional framework, long awaited by citizens of Ukraine and foreign observers
alike, within which the nation of 52 million would develop.
Aside from establishing a constitutional framework-defining the powers of
government, entrenching the principle of private property, establishing the
foundations for future legislation, and so on-the constitution took a step toward the
‘nationalization’ of the Ukrainian state. It endowed Ukrainian national symbols and
the Ukrainian language with official status while providing guarantees for the
protection of the Russian language and other languages of Ukraine’s national
minorities. In practice, the constitution set a course for the ‘re-Urbanization’ of
Ukraine, i.e., the creation of a new nation on the basis of the political, cultural and
linguistic traditions of the Ukrainian people.
The leaders of the Central Rada, who created the Ukrainian state of 1917-18,
already experienced problems in identifying the population of Ukraine with the
Ukrainian people, which they eventually came to identify as ethnic Ukrainians. The
problem remained and even intensified somewhat with the renewal of Ukrainian
independence after 1991, when debates concerning symbols of statehood and the
official status of the Russian language posed a threat to the integrity of Ukraine’s
territory. The borders of the Ukrainian SSR largely coincided with the boundaries of
ethnic Ukrainian settlement at the beginning of the century. But powerful waves of
Russian immigrants to that territory, as well as Moscow’s policies on nationality and
culture, contributed to a situation wherein, at the proclamation of Ukrainian
independence in 1991, approximately twenty percent of Ukraine’s population was
made up of Russians, while most Ukrainians in the east and south of the country were
linguistically and culturally Russified.38
38

For discussions of political symbolism and the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in
Ukraine, see Bohdan Krawchenko, “National Memory in Ukraine: The Role of the Blue and Yellow
Flag,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 27 (Summer 1990): 1-21, and Dominique Arel, “Language
Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?,” Nationalities Papers 23,
no. 3 (September 1995): 597-622. On the history of the boundaries of Ukraine, see Vasyl’ Boiechko,
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Okeana Hanzha and Borys Zakharchuk, Kordony Ukrainy: istorychna perspektyva ta suchasnyi s ten
(Kyiv, 1994). Questions pertaining to Ukraine’s territorial integrity are discussed in the following
articles: Serhii Plokhy, “Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the
Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute,” in The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of
Eurasia, The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 1, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY and London,
1994), pp. 147-70; Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, “The Russian Factor and Territorial
Polarization in Ukraine,” Harriman Review 9, nos. 1-2 (Spring 1996): 81-91.
Oles Honchar became the one “infallible” hero of Volodymyr Lytvyn’s book, Politychna
arena Ukrainy. For attempts by Ukrainian writers to develop a cult of Oles Honchar, see Ivan
Koshelivets’, “Mozhna odverto?” Suchasnist', no. 10 (1997): 112-21.
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In the complex matter of defining the new nation, the constitution sought to
overcome the dichotomy that had held in thrall the Ukrainian political leaders of the
first decades of the century: the Ukrainian people considered as the Ukrainian ethnos
and the people of Ukraine understood as the entire population of the country. The
preamble to the constitution defines the Ukrainian people as all the citizens of
Ukraine, regardless of ethnic origin (the ‘people of Ukraine’ of the leaders of the
Central Rada), while the term ‘Ukrainian nation’ as used in the preamble is clearly
meant to designate Ukrainians as an ethnic group (the ‘Ukrainian people’ of the
leaders of the Central Rada). Despite this obvious confusion in terminology, which
resulted from the compromises and the feverish haste with which the basic law was
adopted in parliament, the preamble to the constitution clearly testifies to an attempt
to overcome the outworn terminology and conceptual conflict in order to create a
Ukrainian political nation (the constitution calls it the ‘Ukrainian people’) on the
basis of the political and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian ethnos (the ‘Ukrainian
nation’ of the preamble), incorporating the potential of ‘citizens of Ukraine of all
nationalities.’39
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See the text of the constitution of Ukraine in Holos Ukrainy, 13 July 1996. According to press
reports, representatives of national-democratic forces came out actively in parliament against the
definition of the Ukrainian people as consisting of the citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities. The
constitutional draft presented earlier by the communist faction in the Supreme Council used the
formula “people of Ukraine,” understood as the totality of citizens of all ethnic origins resident on the
territory of Ukraine (see “Proekt KonstyLutsii (Osnovnoho Zakonu) Ukrains’koi Radians~koi
Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky,’” Holos Ukrainy, 25 July 1995). The first universal of the Central Rada
appealed to the “Ukrainian people in Ukraine and outside Ukraine,” the second to “citizens of the
Ukrainian land,” the third to “the Ukrainian people and all the peoples of Ukraine,” and, finally, the
fourth, which proclaimed Ukrainian independence, to “the people of Ukraine.” (See the texts of the
universals in Politolohiia (Lviv, 1996), pp. 755-63.)
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In essence, of the three possible models of nation-building-exclusive
nationalism, inclusive nationalism, and the creation of a multi-ethnic political nationUkrainian lawmakers had chosen the second.40 In the spirit of ‘inclusive’
nationalism, the authors of the Constitution granted equality before the law to citizens
of all ethnic origins and religious creeds. Article 35 of the constitution guarantees all
citizens of Ukraine the “freedom to profess any religion or to profess none” and
makes provision for non-military service as an alternative to service in the armed
forces. Religious freedom may be restricted only “in the interest of preserving social
order, the health and morality of the population, or the defense of the rights and
freedoms of others.”
Church and state, according to article 35, are separate from one another, as is
the school from the church. “No religion may be designated as obligatory by the
state,” according to the article. Other articles, notably article 24, guarantee foreigners
legally present in Ukraine the same rights as those enjoyed by citizens of Ukraine.41
The principles of religious legislation embodied in the constitution of Ukraine
conform to the most stringent norms of international law in this sphere and are
intended to break with the atheist tradition of crass state interference in the affairs of
religious associations, as well as with the post-Soviet practice of supporting one
denomination at the expense of another.

40 For the discussion of the politics of inclusive nationalism in Ukraine, see Alexander J. Motyl,
Dilemmas of Independence, pp. 70-75, 79-80.
41

See Holos Ukrainy, 13 July 1996. The communist draft of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR did
not include a number of guarantees of separation of church and state provided in the constitution of
Ukraine, but guaranteed freedom of atheist activity (Holos Ukrainy, 25 July 1995). (Similar to this was
the article on freedom of religion in the draft constitution submitted for general discussion by the
Supreme Council of Ukraine in July 1992).
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The actions of the Ukrainian authorities, most notably those of President
Leonid Kuchma, during the debate on the constitution of Ukraine and following its
adoption by parliament, testified to the government’s desire to adhere to the
principles of church-state relations enunciated in the constitution and discontinue the
practice of active intervention in interdenominational conflicts to take the side of any
of the churches. On the one hand, the grave of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) of
the UOC-KP on St. Sophia Square in Kyiv was put in order under the patronage of
the president. On the other hand, almost immediately after the adoption of the
constitution, the president visited his native village in the Chernihiv region, where he
took part in the consecration of a new Orthodox church by the clergy of the
UOC-MP. The president’s actions with respect to the two competing Orthodox
churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), were thus
intended to make apparent the authorities’ desire to avoid prejudice in their treatment
of religious associations in conflict with one another. In practice, this was finally
accomplished following two years of President Leonid Kuchma’s religious policy,
years that had been neither easy nor free of problems in the area of church-state
relations.
.
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